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The Future of Liberal Democracy in the International Legal Order
Tom Ginsburg

From Is the International Legal Order Unraveling?
(David L. Sloss ed., Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2022).

Introduction
Liberal democracy is a feature of national political order that can be promoted, defended, or
undermined by international legal institutions. It is not a feature of international legal order itself,
nor can it be, given the inherent pluralism about ways of organizing government that is constitutive
of the international legal system. But neither is it the case that any particular liberal democracy is
an island; liberalism is itself a transnational ideology, and both the expansion and recession of
democracy around the world have been the result of interdependent decisions made by states and
other transnational actors.
Of particular importance has been the role of hegemons in the system, promoting particular kinds
of governance, notably the United States in the post-World War II period. The liberal international
order whose death has become a matter of conventional wisdom was largely a product of US
empire. For this reason, the single biggest factor affecting the future of liberal democracy going
forward will be the role of hegemons and large powers. For the near term, those are the United
States, China, Russia and the EU, with India obviously a relevant player as well. As these powers
interact, they will create conditions that will advance or retard liberal democracy.
We already see some trends under way that seem likely to continue, and they are not pretty. Liberal
democracies have had their confidence challenged in recent years, and bureaucrats in Brussels and
Geneva are favored targets. Liberal democracies are perceived to have delegated too much power
upward, rendering them unable to deliver policies that people want. This has led some to turn
away from the liberal brand. Certainly, the United States under President Trump gave up its role
as chief promoter of democracy, ceding that role to the European Union and the United Nations.
Whether Biden is able to reverse that course, or is instead, as Philip Cunliffe described him, a kind
of “Brezhnev-like figure” for the liberal order, remains to be seen.1 But authoritarian regimes have
become skillful mimics of democratic forms at the national level, contributing to what some have
called a democratic recession.
This chapter asks the question: what will the international law of democratic governance look like
in 2050? The question reflects the fact that notwithstanding pluralism, there is much normative
architecture supporting liberal democratic norms on the international plane. This architecture is
1
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not matched by equally expansive enforcement, but weak mechanisms do exist. This chapter
speculates on alternative scenarios and what they might mean for the persistence of liberal
democracy as a going concern, through the lens of international law.
I.
Definition and Trends
A. The Architecture of Democracy
Preliminaries first. Aziz Huq and I define constitutional liberal democracy as having three
essential elements: free and fair elections; core rights related to those elections, such as rights to
speech, association and voting as well as a free press; and the bureaucratic rule of law, by which
we mean independent courts and agencies that act according to law, especially when dealing with
matters related to democratic governance.2 This is a relatively thin definition, which helps in
applying it across widely different cultural contexts.
The definition highlights that international law has made contributions to supplying norms,
institutions, and ideas that can reinforce national actors in their democratic practice. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights guarantees citizens the right to participate in public affairs, and to
vote in genuine and periodic elections using a secret ballot.3 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights reinforces these norms in a legally binding treaty.4 The United Nations, while
recognizing the plurality of legitimate regime types, has also supported democratic practice in a
variety of ways, including election monitoring and normative articulation. In a 2017 report, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that his organization had provided electoral
assistance to roughly one-third of its member states.5 And in the 1990s, the organization made
democracy central to its mission. In 1996, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted
An Agenda for Democratization to the General Assembly, seeking to clarify state practice, and
emphasizing an independent judiciary, governmental accountability, the rule of law, and popular
participation. Several other UN documents follow similar conceptions.6
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TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2018).
Universal Declarations of Human Rights, art 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
4
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 5, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
5
United Nations, General Assembly, Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the Effectiveness of
the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/72/260 (Aug. 1, 2017).
6
In 1999, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution entitled A Right to Democracy,
E/CN.4/RES/1999/57, stating that democracy includes “the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of thought,
conscience and religion, and of peaceful association and assembly; the right to freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media; the rule of law, including legal protection of citizens' rights, interests and
personal security, and fairness in the administration of justice and independence of the judiciary; the right of universal
and equal suffrage, as well as free voting procedures and periodic and free elections; the right of political participation,
including equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates; transparent and accountable government
institutions; the right of citizens to choose their governmental system through constitutional or other democratic
means; and the right to equal access to public service in one's own country.” A later document added elements of
pluralism. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 19/36, Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 19th. Sess., U.N.
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Beyond these global documents, regional activity in Africa, Latin America and Europe has
supported the spread and maintenance of democracy.7 The Organization of American States and
the African Union have each issued “democracy charters” entrenching democracy as a regional
norm, as has the Economic Community of West African States.8 The European Convention of
Human Rights also has an architecture in this regard, as does the European Union. As international
institutions devote more attention to promoting democracy, they reinforce the normative consensus
around it. Evidence for the normative consensus is that even regional organizations that are
composed mainly of non-democracies, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, assert
that they adhere to principles of democracy.9
This normative consensus has been accompanied with institutional structure as well, even if it has
not been as expansive as the norms. The United Nations has promoted elections and constitutional
reform, as well as providing technical advice. Human rights organizations and private foundations
have also played a role. And regional courts, human rights commissions, and trade blocs have all
encouraged countries to maintain and deepen democracy. They have done so through reports that
expose practices falling short of democratic ideals; judgments sanctioning violations; threats of
expulsion or outcasting; and occasionally through direct intervention or the threat thereof. To be
sure, the record is mixed. However, international institutions can help resist democratic
backsliding, in part by providing resources to democrats trying to advance their cause on the
national level.
B. Trends
This normative consensus, however, has not prevented democratic erosion and backsliding in
practice. Indeed, democratic erosion is one of the great trends of our time. Consider some
statistics. According to the influential Freedom House Survey, the number of democracies peaked
Doc. A/HRC/Res/19/36, at para. 1 (2012) (“democracy includes respect for all human rights and fundamental
freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and opinion, freedom
of thought, conscience, religion or belief, the right to be recognized everywhere as a person before the law and the
right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, to vote in a
pluralistic system of political parties and organizations and to be elected at genuine, periodic, free and fair elections
by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the people, as well
as respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, transparency and
accountability in public administration and decision-making and free, independent and pluralistic media.”)
7
Regional organizations with clauses related to democracy include the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union
(EU), the Andean Community, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the Central American Integration
System (SICA), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the
African Union (AU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community
(EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
8
Organization of American States, The Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11, 2001, O.A.S.T.S; African Union
(AU), Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), Jan. 30, 2007; Protocol of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Democracy and Good Governance, Dec. 10, 1999; Olabisi D.
Akinkugbe, Towards an Analysis of the Mega-Politics Jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice,
in THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL COURTS: USING LITIGATION FOR POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE (JAMES THUO GATHII, ED., OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS) (2020).
9
Preamble, in THE ASEAN CHARTER (ASEAN ed., 2008).

3
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3974951

around 2006, and has declined since then. Other democracy indices show a similar decline in the
number of liberal or full democracies (see Table 1). The quality of democracy has also declined:
each year since 2006, more countries have suffered declines in democracy than have improved.
Table 1
Number of Democracies since 2006
Freedom House # Free countries
V-Dem # Liberal Democracies
Economist Intelligence Unit Full
Democracies

2006
90
41
28

2010
87
45
26

2014
89
43
24

2019
83
37
22

These declines have affected even established democracies: between 2014 and 2019, for example,
the Economist Intelligence Unit downgraded South Korea, Japan, and the United States from “Full
Democracies” to “Flawed Democracies.” The decline has led us to a point where, for the first time
in three decades, less than half of the countries in the world are considered to be even flawed
democracies according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. Furthermore, more than half of the
world’s population lives in non-democracies, whether true authoritarians, or “Hybrid” regimes that
exhibit some democratic forms, such as elections, but do not have genuine competition for political
power.
Table 2
Countries by Category, 2020
# countries
Full Democracies
23
Flawed Democracies 52
Hybrid Regimes
35
Authoritarians
57
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit

% countries
13.8
31.1
21.0
34.1

% world population
8.4
41.0
15.0
35.6

Many of these flawed democracies and hybrid regimes reflect the fact that backsliding does not
involve a sudden collapse of democracy, but instead a gradual process of erosion.10 This involves
a series of steps that attack component parts of a democratic order, one at a time, so as to facilitate
a takeover of the political system. Indeed, some of the leaders who have consolidated power in
their own political systems enjoy a good deal of popularity. Narendra Modi, for example, has
extraordinary charisma, and has consolidated his Bharatiya Janata Party’s control over national
institutions, while eroding some of India’s liberal traditions. India was recently downgraded from
“Free” to “Partly Free” in the Freedom House categorization, and characterized as an electoral
autocracy in the V-Dem assessment. Victor Orban, though less popular, valorizes “illiberal
10

Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J.DEM. 5 (2016); GINSBURG AND HUQ, supra note 2.
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democracy” and has consolidated personal control over the Hungarian political system, assuming
the ability to rule by decree without regard to law during the COVID-19 emergency.11
These trends toward illiberalism are beginning to affect international law in several ways,
notwithstanding the stability of the de jure normative framework codified in the UN Charter and
International Covenants. First, authoritarians are forming their own international organizations to
cooperate across borders. Authoritarian cooperation has of course long been a feature of
international law, going back to the Congress of Vienna, through the Axis bloc, the Warsaw Pact,
and the COMINTERN. But as I have argued elsewhere, we are seeing a new level of sophistication
in authoritarian use of international organizations, in which new norms to promote order and
stability are being articulated.12 Authoritarian international organizations are expanding in number,
type, and ambition, enhancing their ability to dilute democratic norms. Some, like the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, sponsor election monitors and provide technical “assistance,” which
dilutes the efforts by European institutions to ensure electoral integrity. By 2050, we may see
authoritarian-dominated international organizations that sponsor their own “democracy charters”
that pay lip service to democracy promotion, but function primarily to dilute the operation of the
real deal. Election interference may become so subtle that it is hard to detect, in turn undermining
public confidence in voting machinery.
Second, proto authoritarians are eroding the pro-democratic quality of governance in established
international institutions. Central here are battles over the rule of law in the European Union. In
late 2020, the self-described “illiberal democracies” of Hungary and Poland delayed the adoption
of the European Union budget, and were able to dilute (though not eliminate) provisions
reinforcing the commitment to the rule of law among member states. Both governments had
engaged in systematic programs of taking over the courts in their countries, purging them of
liberals, and promoting like-minded jurists who would advance the political agendas of the
governing parties. At the international level, these countries have proven immune to discipline
from the European Union or the Council of Europe. That a rich industrialized region could fall
prey to democratic backsliding suggests that no country is immune, and also illustrates the
weakness of the international mechanisms to enforce democratic norms in the face of strong and
sustained political movements.
C. Causes
The causes of this trend of democratic erosion are contested. Some blame the global financial crisis
of 2008-2009. Technological change may also play a role, especially because it has eroded the
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Each of these countries has experienced a decline over time in its democratic status. According to V-DEM, India
was an electoral democracy consistently until the 2020 downgrade. Hungary was a liberal democracy through 2005,
then was an electoral democracy in 2010; and it was downgraded to an electoral autocracy in 2018.
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media as an authoritative gatekeeper of information. Disruption has allowed anti-democrats to
flood the information environment with disinformation.13
The neoliberal economic order is a favourite target of critics. By hollowing out industrial
workforces in the rich world, it resulted in both job insecurity and increased movement of people,
leading to backlash in the rich democracies of the world.14 The famous “Elephant graph” produced
by Branko Milanovic purported to show that the era of globalization benefited a large majority of
the global population, but hurt the members of the working classes in rich democracies. The
argument was that these groups then rebelled against globalization. However, the data underlying
this account is highly sensitive to which countries are included in the analysis, and Milanovic’s
thesis has not generated consensus.15 Perhaps we need to look elsewhere for a viable theory of
democracy’s decline.
My view is that the key factors lie in the realm of culture and identity, rather than economy.
Migration is critical here.16 With the increased ability to move, massive numbers of poorer citizens
contributed to the displacement of lower-class wage-earners in the rich world; the “Polish
plumber” of the European Union was the “illegal immigrant” of California. Even though data
seem to suggest that these immigrants raised the average wages of the natives, the sense of losing
control provided rich soil for demagogues. Fear of cultural change, in other words, was a key
dimension contributing to pressures on established democracies.17
Another factor in democratic decline has been the trajectory of certain authoritarian states,
particularly Russia and China, that have accumulated material and symbolic power in recent years.
Russia and China have become perhaps the most vocal defenders of the sovereigntist view of
international order, and have attacked its liberal basis. They had very strong responses to the US
policy of regime change, and dismemberment of sovereign states after the 1999 invasion of
Kosovo. They thus perceived, accurately, a threat in the US-led world order. Their responses were
measured, but the overall increased leverage that they enjoyed no doubt contributed to pressure on
the liberal democratic model.
II.
Three Scenarios
In this section, I speculate on three different scenarios and explain how they matter for international
law and institutions. One is authoritarian dominance; the second is democratic revival; and the
13

DAVID SLOSS, TYRANTS ON TWITTER: PROTECTING DEMOCRACIES FROM CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INFORMATION
WARFARE (2021).
14
See Richard H. Steinberg, The Rise and Decline of a Liberal International Order (chapter 1 in this volume).
15
Caroline Freund, Deconstructing Branko Milanovic’s “Elephant Chart”: Does It Show What Everyone Thinks?,
PIIE (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/deconstructing-brankomilanovics-elephant-chart-does-it-show.
16
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration and International Legal Disorder (chapter 14 in this volume).
17
Milada Anna Vachudova, Ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding in Central Europe, 36(3) E. EUR. POL. 318
(2020).
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third is a duopoly, in which the US and China come to a modus vivendi.
The single biggest change that will occur between now and 2050 is the dominance that China will
exert over much of Eurasia, Africa, and the Pacific. Because China is extremely unlikely to
liberalize or democratize, this means that an authoritarian power will play a central role in the
world economy as well as regional—and perhaps global—security. China’s strategy to date has
been to try to dilute and repurpose the language of liberal democracy, while embedding its own
concepts in the United Nations and other fora. The rise of Xi Jinping since 2013 has been
accompanied by a new language of international relations, including “win-win” (共赢- “gong
ying”) foreign policy, “mutually beneficial cooperation,” and “a Community of Shared Future for
Mankind.”18 China is promoting these concepts at the United Nations, sponsoring resolutions and
initiatives to provide legal imprimatur for its policies.19
The future of liberal democracy in the international legal order will depend very much on whether
these trends continue, and how existing democratic powers react to them. The United States will
play an outsized role in this regard, but lacks the weight to dictate responses unilaterally and so
will need to work with other democratic powers. In this section, I outline three scenarios. The
law, as always, follows power imperfectly, and so the enforcement of the existing norms will
depend very much on the relationship between the United States and China as the world’s two
largest economies, and the world’s most powerful democracy and autocracy, respectively.
Before launching into the three scenarios, it is worth identifying a fourth outcome that will surely
not occur: a return to a Westphalian golden age. Westphalian sovereignty is an ideal type that
international lawyers often use to locate principles like non-interference and sovereign equality,
principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. Professor Gerry Simpson describes this system
as embodying “Charter Liberalism”: just as in a liberal society, each individual is free to engage
in any behavior that does not harm others, so in international society, each state is free to organize
its internal affairs in whatever way it likes, so long as it does not abuse its citizens too much, or
cause harm to another state.20 And while powerful states have often contravened the principle of
non-interference, it remains a touchstone of the international legal order. Practically, this means
that countries are free to pick their regimes, whether an Islamic Republic, Communist dictatorship,
or absolute monarchy. Nevertheless, the ideal of absolute autonomy is, and always has been, a
fiction. Even the Treaty of Westphalia itself allowed for some international rules governing
internal affairs of states.21And various forms of coercion to get states to adopt favored policies
remain a feature of international life, exercised by the United States, Russia, the EU, and China.
There is no return to an imagined past. Instead, the future of the international legal order will be
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Gerry Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 537 (2001).
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determined by how these powerful states, with their different visions for international law, interact
in the coming decades.
The utility of these kinds of scenario-building exercises, which have been engaged in by national
defense agencies, large oil companies and other actors, is to sharpen the alternatives to help inform
strategic thinking. The scenarios are in some sense themselves ideal-types, and reality is invariably
messier. Nevertheless, the three have starkly different predictions for the future of liberal
democracy.
A. Authoritarian Dominance
Since the dawn of the reform and opening era under Deng Xiaoping, China has transformed from
a bit player in global affairs to a major power in every field. The extraordinary shift has been
driven by massive economic growth, and some political evolution, that has made the People’s
Republic more powerful and secure than at any time in its modern history. China’s rise raises the
question of whether liberal democracy will remain viable outside a core set of rich industrial
democracies, such as South Korea, Japan and Western Europe.
China’s relationship with international law during the period of the People’s Republic has been
consistently pragmatic, which is quite remarkable given the deployment of that law as an
instrument of Western colonialism in Chinese history. International law facilitated the
dismemberment of Chinese territory during the Opium Wars and after the Sino-Japanese War of
1895. It justified “Unequal Treaties,” which reversed China’s traditional hierarchical view of
international order by positing white Europeans as the source of civilization. In the postrevolutionary era, the People’s Republic was kept out of the United Nations until 1971.22 Despite
all this, China has engaged with international law since the 1950s, for example, by helping to
convene the Bandung conference in 1955.23 In the reform and opening era, it has joined many
international regimes and signed many treaties, including the WTO and bilateral investment
treaties that structure international economic law. It has become a major player at the UN and other
international institutions. And in the face of American rejection of this architecture during the
Trump administration, China has emerged as a leading defender of multilateralism.
China’s approach is not fully evolved, but like domestic reform, more experimental and
incremental, in keeping with Deng Xiaoping’s famous aphorism “cross the river by feeling the
stones.” There is a mix of compliance and resistance to international norms, depending on the
issue at stake.
China has, however, taken a consistent approach. It has been extraordinarily aggressive in pursuing
its self-defined core interests. Detlev Vagts coined the term “hegemonic international law” to
Phil C. Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law since the Opium War, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L 859 (2014).
BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES (Luis Eslava,
Michael Fakhri & Vashuki Nesiah eds., 2017).
22
23
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characterize the attitude of the United States in the early 21st century, in the midst of the Global
War on Terror.24 China has similarly sought to avoid obligations that impinge on its flexibility in
areas of vital strategic importance, such as the South China Sea. In the face of the Philippines’
victory in the arbitration over maritime delimitation there,25 in which China refused to participate,
economic coercion was swift and effective. China’s aggressive tactics induced a complete change
of course under the government of strongman Rodrigo Duterte. Any hint of recognition of Taiwan
brings furious retaliation, and China has stepped up pressure on the island, even sabre rattling
before the 2020 re-election of Tsai Ing-Wen. Its diplomats presented a list of 14 demands to
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in late 2020, in response to perceived slights committed
by that country. It initiated a border clash with India in the high Himalayas, and has ended
tolerance of political liberalism in Hong Kong.
The implications for the international legal order are significant. China has declared that
reunification with Taiwan is a non-negotiable core goal. If it attempts to achieve reunification by
using force, it would likely succeed. The fact that both countries agree that Taiwan is a part of
China means that this may not itself be considered a violation of international law, although other
states reacted to the Anti-Secession law of 2005 as if it were an international matter. The United
States has retained a studied ambiguity on these questions, which presents a possibility of future
conflict.
The “feelings of the Chinese people” has emerged as a rhetorical trump card. China acts like a
thin-skinned bully on certain issues, and a confident superpower on others. This behavior may be
self-defeating, and there is a school of thought that says China is acting too aggressively too early.
Just as the concentration of power in the person of Mao Zedong led to massive errors, in the form
of the Cultural Revolution, so the Xi Jinping era is seeing a single individual dominate the system,
driving major shifts in behavior. If its aggressive approach, combined with international suspicion
related to the novel coronavirus, leads to backlash, China may not end up dominating the twentyfirst century. There are also internal sources of brittleness that may present challenges. 26
However, there are forces at work that will be hard to avoid. China’s economy continues to grow
at a rapid clip. Its system of techno-authoritarianism means that there is strict control on internal
criticism. It is likely to prove a resilient authoritarian.27 Furthermore, every western strategy has
failed to change China. The idea that the WTO would lead to internal liberalization has obviously
not played out.28 Embedding China in the rules-based international order has led to its takeover of
some of that architecture. It has used the nominally private character of its firms to capture markets,
even as western firms are kept out of the Chinese market. It has engaged in systematic programs
Detlev Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843 (2001).
The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), 33 R.I.A.A. 153 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
26
See Minxin Pei, China’s Coming Upheaval, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2020.
27
See Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens
Autocracy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2020.
28
But see a nuanced account by Yeling Tan, Disaggregating “China, Inc”: The Hierarchical Politics of WTO Entry,
53 COMP. POL. STUD. 13 (2020).
24
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of state-sponsored industrial espionage. Its investment in military capacity continues at a rapid
clip. If engagement failed to domesticate China, neither does confrontation, as practiced by the
Trump administration, appear to have paid off.
While China may be unlikely to become a true global hegemon, in the sense of being the dominant
power in a unipolar world, that scenario is still a distinct possibility. Should it come to pass, China
will act as hegemons do. It will be the single most powerful player in the global standards game,
displacing Europe; the so-called Brussels effect may become the Beijing effect.29 China will also
work with other dictatorships to advance a specifically authoritarian international law.
In the first place, this law will be defensive, as we have already seen for example in the 2016
Russia-China Declaration on the Promotion of International Law.30 While committing to the
peaceful settlement of international disputes, the Declaration reaffirms the importance of consent
and good faith, a position that “applies equally to all types and stages of dispute settlement.”31 One
might read this as requiring specific consent to each instance of inter-state dispute resolution. The
Declaration also specifically mentions UNCLOS and the requirement of consistent application of
its provisions, “in such a manner that does not impair rights and legitimate interests of States
Parties”32—a thinly veiled reference to the South China Sea Arbitration. The Declaration also
condemns terrorism, unilateral sanctions, and coercive measures outside the context of the Security
Council process, while reaffirming state immunity. Though sounding in classical Westphalian
sovereignty, the Russia-China Declaration is in fact more sophisticated; it reflects a good deal of
learning and experimentation by authoritarian leaders, enabling them to extend their own rule and
reinforce each other.33 A changing balance of power in favor of authoritarians will give these
countries greater weight in the formation of international law generally, as well as the ability to
deploy specific strategies within the field.
China’s more active role would seem to belie its rhetorical emphasis on Westphalian norms of
state sovereignty and non-intervention.34 Yet, China has been consistent on one point. China’s
brand does not include promoting a specific model of domestic governance, and I doubt that this
will change in the future. Chinese authoritarianism is decidedly not ideological in terms of its
external footprint.35 This is not the Soviet Union, exporting global communism; nor even Saudi
Arabia, whose subsidy of Wahhabism has colored the character of Islam in many parts of the
world. China’s particular international profile takes Bandung seriously to some extent. China is
29

ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE WORLD (2020).
Kenneth Anderson, Text of Russia-China Joint Declaration on Promotion and Principles of International Law,
LAWFARE (July 7, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/text-russia-china-joint-declaration-promotion-and-principlesinternational-law.
31
Id., para 5.
32
Id., para 9.
33
Kendall-Taylor et al, supra note 27.
34
Yin He, China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations, INST. FOR SECURITY AND DEV. POL'Y (July
2007), http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2007_he_chinas-changing-policy.pdf.
35
Jessica Chen Weiss, An Ideological Contest in U.S.-China Relations? Assessing China’s Defense of Autocracy, 28
J. CONTEMP. CHINA 679 (2019).
30
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perfectly willing to let national leaders be chosen through democratic or nondemocratic means. It
simply asks those leaders not to cross certain red lines. Obviously, there are exceptions, such as
Taiwan, which is considered to be a fundamental part of the national territory. But, to give just
one example, China has tolerated multiparty democracy in Mongolia, over which it gave up claims
in January 1946, for three decades. The massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) incorporates all
kinds of regimes into the warm embrace of a Beijing-centered economic system. This might
suggest that democracy in some form has a fighting chance in a China-centered world.
However, the importance of getting along with China may determine who gets elected in
democracies. And China’s need for certainty in its relations along the Belt and Road may push it
to intervene on behalf of particular favored partners who can deliver. China has demonstrated its
interest in picking winners in domestic politics in certain cases. For example, it openly backed the
Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka, as it veered in a strongly authoritarian direction. Similarly, China
openly backed the corrupt President Abdulla Yameen in the Maldives, though voters still threw
him out of power in 2018. And China’s ability to export the technology of repression, particularly
in the digital realm, will make it an attractive partner to leaders with authoritarian aspirations. 36
Thus, even without active promotion of authoritarian governance, there will be hydraulic pressures
that will diminish the space of liberal democracy. Criticism of Papa Xi will be de facto forbidden
in vast swaths of the earth, even as the International Covenant and national constitutions provide
for freedom of speech. Other terms will be given new, thinner meanings. The rule of law will
remain a powerful ideal, but its meaning will be transformed: it will mean that the rulers will act
through laws, as in the “rule of law with Chinese characteristics.”
At the same time, a China-dominated world may very likely be more peaceful than one led by the
United States. The country has not fought a war, other than on its borders with Korea and Vietnam,
since World War II. It is not going to use armed forces to export autocracy in the same way that
the liberal United States has done for democracy, though it surely wants to make the world safe
for dictatorship. Thus, we might predict that Chinese hegemony will reinforce the prohibition on
the use of military force. Pro-democratic interventions, even those done by regional powers like
ECOWAS, will be disfavored, except in the rare cases in which China for some reason favors it,
or is not sufficiently interested to push back. Interstate war may still occur among small countries,
but Beijing can play a mediating role. So far, its attempts to do so, for example between Sudan and
South Sudan, have not been particularly effective. But it may learn.
International legal discourse will have completely internalized Chinese-promoted virtues and
values: principles of amity, sincerity, dialogue, mutual benefit from “win-win” governance, and
inclusiveness furthering a “community of shared destiny.” The father of these terms, Xi Jinping,
will celebrate his 97th birthday in 2050, just a few months after the PRC’s centenary. Xi will be
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comfortably retired, but still highly influential in resolving disputes among his chosen successors,
now in the “seventh generation” of leadership since the founding of the PRC.
Authoritarian international law tends to involve very thin commitments. Wary of unexpected
costs, authoritarians are less likely to entrust matters to binding third-party dispute resolution.
Their forms of cooperation tend to be informal, thin and flexible. Only in international economic
law—the WTO and the network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)—have we observed
systematic willingness to submit to third-party dispute resolution, and even here the approach has
not been as open as some other countries, having retrenched since 2007.37
The model of the Belt and Road Initiative lays the groundwork for what authoritarian international
law with Chinese characteristics might look like in years to come. The BRI features loose forms
of economic cooperation, taking the form of framework agreements that allow for mutual
adjustment over time. The BRI also has a hub and spokes quality, with each participant interacting
bilaterally with Beijing, rather than through a multilateral forum in which smaller nations can
cooperate with each other.38 This approach allows China to maximize leverage vis-à-vis each
participating country while minimizing the possibility that others will band together to make
demands. Flexibility, a blurring of the public-private divide, and minimal use of third-party dispute
resolution at a state-to-state level are key features of this model.
China has in recent years become a skilled player at the United Nations. The United Nations will
remain at the center of international legal order, and in some areas, such as the use of force, its
norms may be strengthened. China has been a major player, seeking to head off criticism of its
internal practices and to promote its interests. A China dominated UN will be less of a force for
human rights and democracy. In economic law, China will be quite willing to play by regional
and multilateral rules that it has largely shaped, unless there is some reason to do otherwise.
Whether the WTO is revived after the assault by the Trump administration, there is no doubt that
a formally open trade regime is in China’s interest. At the same time, bilateralism rather than
multilateralism tends to be its preferred approach for economic commitments, an approach that
allows it to bring its full weight to bear vis a vis any particular partner.
Cyber law is one of the great areas in play at present. China has taken an approach to the internet
that emphasizes national sovereignty and security, rather than the “free and open internet” pushed
by democracies.39 China’s prodigious technical capacities will be brought to bear here, establishing
standards that can then be used to ensure its complete internal control, and possibly external
control, of what gets seen where. Look for cyber-erasure of Taiwan, meaning the elimination of
references to the jurisdiction, and possibly extraterritorial criminalization of “splittists” who sit in
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its government or call for independence. Even if Taiwan manages to remain independent for the
next 30 years, it will have ever narrower scope for action
Human rights, of course, will remain a centerpiece of global rhetoric, but will be less rigorously
enforced than ever. Here, China will be joined by a wide array of illiberal regimes, which have
targeted LGBT individuals and religious minorities, in emphasizing national cultures rather than a
homogeneous globalized one. Less well appreciated is China’s pivot away from an internal policy
that tolerated and indeed formally celebrated cultural pluralism. The erasure of internal cultural
minorities, currently on display in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, will proceed apace. This
may have implications for foreign causes that sound in self-determination. The Western Sahara,
Kurdistan, Palestine, and other causes will find less support as the forces of order dominate the
forces of freedom. Instead, the recently articulated norms of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization against “extremism” and “separatism” will be globalized.
But none of this will mean the complete erasure of democratic discourse on the international plane.
Liberal discourses of freedom and self-governance will continue to be popular among national
publics. The world’s prior hegemon, the United States, may selectively promote these discourses
and could provide a counterweight for those fearing the yoke of repression, but its toolkit will be
very limited. Democrats may retain the moral high ground, but the institutionalization of
democratic norms will diminish on the international level.
In short, a China-dominated world will not be good for liberal democracy on the international
plane. The rich normative architecture of democracy charters and human rights instruments will
lay mostly dormant, further eroding protection for human rights and democratic norms.
To be sure, there are many roadblocks in the way of this scenario becoming a reality. There are
many obstacles to Chinese hegemony, not least its aggressive behavior that, as of 2020, has soured
many other nations on its approach. Hegemons, China is learning, are feared and not loved, and
there is something of a backlash against China at this writing. And of course, American military
power continues to be overwhelming. But even if China’s global hegemony is not realistic,
“authoritarian dominance” is certainly a realistic scenario. In this scenario, liberal democracy will
gradually recede to a small group of core states, and authoritarianism will gradually expand in
terms of the number of governments, their resilience, and their use of international law to cooperate
with each other and to shape international norms.
B. Democratic Revival
The United States has just barely survived its experiment with authoritarian populism in the person
of Donald Trump. Although the 1990s, when the liberal order seemed to be the only game in town,
will never return, our recent “near miss” may trigger efforts to shore up America’s political and
economic vulnerabilities. This could lead to a renewal of liberal democracy at home and a return
to a vigorous set of alliances abroad. One might even contemplate a revival of the idea of a
“community of democracies,” which as it stands is a relatively unimportant international
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organization,40 but could be a more deeply integrated set of alliances, linked by trade and common
values. Perhaps the democracies will work with each other to achieve a partial decoupling from a
prickly Chinese regime that has shown itself willing to use maximal leverage in response to fairly
minor perceived slights. This implies a trade system that is less focused on the WTO and more
focused on serving strategic interests. Groupings like the “Five Eyes” could expand from their
focus on security and intelligence to encompass common liberal traditions and approaches.
If liberalism is to survive and thrive, the existence of current international laws and institutions
that favor democracy may play an important role in preventing decline. The UN human rights
machinery has lost credibility in some quarters because of its obsessive focus on Israel, while
ignoring severe repression by dictatorships. But regional machinery has been more effective at
both developing norms and enforcing them. Already we have seen a series of pro-democratic
regional interventions. For example, the Organization of American States played a role in resolving
the Honduran crisis of 2009, when President Manuel Zelaya was removed from office while in his
pajamas and spirited out of the country. The OAS has had less success with Venezuela. But the
other Bolivarian regimes of Ecuador and Bolivia have remained in the democratic camp. Similarly
in Africa, the African Union and ECOWAS have conducted a series of regional interventions that
have staved off would-be authoritarians. The African Union has gone further than other
international organizations by specifically targeting unconstitutional changes in government, a
category which includes not only coups and mercenary takeovers, but also manipulation of term
limits by incumbent leaders.41 Since most democracies these days die through incumbent takeover
rather than military coup, this is a particularly important norm.
The return of a liberal order will not mean that every project of the 1990s is plausible. The
International Criminal Court has suffered attacks on its capacity by the United States as well as
African countries. The willingness of the ICC to indict national political leaders around the issue
of electoral violence has produced backlash. But international criminal law is not an essential
liberal democratic project.
At the same time, human rights will do much better in a liberal world. The machinery of the UN
will remain ineffectual, but national level pressures from Europe and the Western powers will have
a strong deterrent effect on the worst abuses in some smaller countries. Regional human rights
bodies will revive and thrive. Their jurisprudence on rights of speech and association, which are
at the core of the liberal project, will become definitive and will lead to national level compliance
even by some hybrid regimes.
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In this scenario, the European Union will eventually grapple with the presence of non-democratic
Hungary in its midst. The Brexit experience will demonstrate that having a country leave the
Union is feasible, and the Europeans will threaten to disband the entire Union and re-form it
without Hungary, instituting large tariffs on Hungarian goods entering the new EU. The resulting
economic pressures may eventually unseat Viktor Orban. The EU will allow Poland to remain in
the EU after Polish voters reject the current illiberal government and a new liberal government is
voted in.
The endurance of liberal democracy, giving substance to the rich normative architecture of
democracy, does not mean that every country will become a democracy. The resurgence of liberal
power will survive because it won’t over-reach. Liberalism in the 1990s came crashing down on
the shore of the Iraq war, and a global neoliberal regime that benefited wealthy elites on the
promise of redistribution that never occurred. A revival of liberal democracy will, paradoxically,
require recognizing that authoritarian powers have legitimate spheres of influence that should be
respected. Chinese power in Asia is sure to rise. But it has already shown that it can co-exist with
vital liberal countries such as South Korea and Japan. (Taiwan is, of course, a special problem.)
Similarly, NATO will have to come to terms with Russia, an inherently authoritarian power.
Russia’s near abroad will be in its control but there may be opportunities for liberal advances in
particular countries so long as they do not threaten Russia militarily. As I write, a liberal
government has taken over in Armenia, but is remaining in the Soviet military sphere. These kinds
of opportunities will require restraint on the part of large western powers.
Yet this scenario will also require aggressive policing when a country appears to be backsliding
too severely. Refraining from unilateral “regime change” interventions is the first order of
business for a chastened United States, but multilateral interventions may still be worth pursuing
in some parts of the world to prevent coups and other sudden democratic collapses. In terms of the
other more serious threat, the risk of slow erosion, international cooperation may be less effective.
Deploying non-military resources, including economic access and soft power, can go a long way
in the absence of the use of force. But at the end of the day the direction that democracies take will
be determined by their citizens, and in our era of nationalism, liberalism is under threat in many
countries.
International economic law will have adjusted to recognize a growing role for the state in national
economies, in democracies as well as dictatorships. Rules for state owned enterprises and publicly
subsidized markets will require sophisticated negotiations, but the collective market power of
liberal democracies can be coordinated to keep rules from being abused by statist economies.
Liberalism’s survival will require a robust engagement in the realms of cyber governance, artificial
intelligence and other technological developments.42 The precise shape of this engagement is not
yet clear, but liberal states will need to agree on a common set of principles and approaches,
42
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instantiated in technical standards, to ensure that technology does not erode democracy. It may
involve a modus vivendi with large authoritarian powers. It probably involves engaging in a
serious revisiting of the current free-market approach to companies like Facebook and Google,
which have tremendous power to control political messaging. More vigorous antitrust
enforcement is now in the works, although the tools of antitrust were not devised with platform
economies in mind. Some solution to the political dominance of these small number of firms will
be essential.43 In turn, this will require transnational regulatory harmonization, and possibly even
formal agreements, so that the platforms do not simply relocate to low-regulation jurisdictions.
If this scenario is to become a reality, it will require American leadership and cooperation from
the couple dozen mature democracies around the world. Together they can help liberal democracy
overcome its current malaise to develop enhanced capacity to coordinate regulatory approaches,
while allowing relatively unrestricted flows of goods and services among democracies. The
challenge of mass migration will have to be addressed as well.
C. Duopoly
If the first two scenarios rely on the dominance of China and the United States, respectively, the
third is based on the cooperation of the two. The international legal order is founded on sovereign
equality, but some sovereigns are more equal than others. Many of the greatest problems facing
mankind will require common action that can only be achieved if large powers coordinate their
policies in areas of vital interests. The duopoly idea is that the United States and China come to a
modus vivendi to accommodate each others’ core interests.
In the security sphere, this will require accommodation of Chinese interests in the Western Pacific.
This means a creative resolution of the Taiwan problem in a complex federation that allows
permanent autonomy for the “renegade province,” avoiding the mistakes of the now-failed Hong
Kong experiment. The autonomy would be externally guaranteed, and the deployment of Chinese
military forces on the island would be strictly limited. Other Western Pacific powers would have
to reduce their cooperation with the U.S. military, perhaps being limited to strictly defensive
postures.
International economic law will remain relatively open and markets will be competitive. China
and the United States will continue to engage in interdependent economic relations, and WTO
rules will remain a floor for global trade relations. At the same time, the WTO exception for free
trade areas will allow for special spheres of economic influence by both major powers. The
recently enacted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which brings in states from
Australia to Japan, provides a framework, and may provide a multilateral counterpart to China’s
so-far bilateral approach.
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In this scenario, the very weak current rules of international environmental law are re-invigorated
by US-China cooperation on the existential issue of climate change. A framework treaty is
negotiated in the 2020s that effectively confronts problems of carbon leakage and uses the market
power of the G-2 to ensure compliance by smaller states. Technological innovations in carbon
sequestration allow the world to begin to remove carbon from the atmosphere, although the untold
suffering of rising seas and weather-related disasters continues unabated. Still, close coordination
of the two countries’ scientific communities is facilitated by blockchain-based schemes that reduce
levels of industrial espionage and ensure that dual-use technologies are restricted to their nonmilitary usages. Furthermore, the two countries develop a common approach to the Law of the
Sea that facilitates exploration of the deep seabed, while saving the world’s fisheries from the
collapse that was threatened earlier in the century. Finally, there is great potential for cooperation
on global public health issues, something which the COVID-19 virus has made highly salient. The
cooperation of the two largest powers helps tackle global problems.
In this scenario, liberal democracy stands a fighting chance. China is no friend of liberal
democracy, but neither is it an implacable enemy, when practiced outside its own borders. The
United States will surely have to accommodate China’s preferences in its sphere of influence, and
there may be tensions that arise for the democracies of the Western Pacific. But we could see a
flourishing of liberal democracy in regions like Latin America and Africa. This outcome will
depend on a particular approach from the United States and Europe, namely, not to be overly
aggressive in pushing for regime change, but rather to let countries’ internal dynamics play out.
In this sense the outcome is not unlike that described above under the “democratic revival
scenario,” except that the relative sizes of the democratic and non-democratic spheres are more
balanced. The US and China will need to have some rules of engagement in this regard, but given
China’s generally non-ideological stance, this should be feasible.

III.
Prospects
To summarize, I see three possibilities for global order going forward, each with its own
implications for liberal democracy. The three can be arrayed in terms of the relative space for
liberal democracy as a going concern around the world. In the event of liberal resurgence, liberal
norms and international cooperation will thrive, not just in the core, but in a growing number of
states. This, as noted, cannot take place at the barrel of a gun. But liberal democracies remain
attractive places and contribute an outsized share to global culture. Their brand may be currently
diminished, but democracies are capable of reinvention.
In the duopoly scenario, the United States and China will cooperate to solve global problems and
agree to disagree about the others’ systems of governance. This will require recognition of a
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Chinese sphere of influence in much of Central Asia and the Western Pacific.44 Countries within
this sphere will move in an illiberal direction, in ways that are already being demonstrated in the
Philippines and India. Global democracy promotion will not disappear, but for practical purposes
it will be limited to the regions of Latin America and Africa and led largely by local institutions
like the OAS and ECOWAS.
The scenario of authoritarian dominance will have profound implications for international law as
a whole. Authoritarians, and especially China, do not emphasize thick forms of legally binding
cooperation but instead utilize thinner forms of cooperation that are less intrusive, at least outside
the economic sphere. They have no interest in enforcing human rights abroad, and fear the open
discourse associated with liberal democracy. As it stands, they are developing tools to undermine
democracies, though so far these have only been deployed around the margins. In this scenario,
the number and quality of democracies will continue to diminish, and freedom will remain a dim
hope for many of the world’s citizens.
There are certain commonalities across the scenarios. There will continue to be some space for
liberal democracy on the international legal plane in all of them: no one is going to retract the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as it is too ineffectual to be worth
dismantling. International norms related to democratic participation, human rights, and the rule of
law will remain on paper, even if their practice is affected by global political developments. And
in none of these scenarios does the UN become a significant actor, even as it is the authoritative
keeper of many of the norms. Instead, the action of enforcement will turn on lower-level actors,
at either the national, regional, or plurilateral level.
Of course, these three scenarios do not exhaust the possibilities. But they do capture alternatives
that are sufficiently different to allow us to consider normative implications going forward. I take
it as an assumption that the authoritarian scenario is worth avoiding, even though I do not have
space to work out a complete normative evaluation of the other two. But it is worth noting that,
whether duopoly or liberal resurgence turns out to better describe the world in 2050, the strategy
for today’s democratic leaders is similar. They should invest in the existing normative architecture
and provide support for it by explicitly prioritizing liberal democracy in their international
relations, including trade and investment. Unilateral use of force should be avoided, because much
of the authoritarian backlash that has emerged in this century is a direct reaction to U.S. efforts to
engineer regime change by military means. But regional entities that have intervened militarily to
support democracy, such as ECOWAS, should be supported and reaffirmed, both materially and
symbolically.
Liberal democracy is not the end of history, as developments in the last two decades have well
shown. As my colleague Dan Slater put it in conversation, “democracy is a grind,” requiring
constant hard work in difficult conditions. It is not pretty, and there are missteps and severe
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challenges. Being a citizen of a democracy can be depressing, as leaders continually come up
short. But it is the least bad alternative at present among the forms of government on offer.
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